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CONGRESSIONAL HUNGER CENTER
Strengthening United Nations Human Rights Efforts in Rwanda/Burundi
Progress Report, Number Three
February 24, 1995

The Congressional Hunger Center (CHC), in support of the human rights concerns of its
Chainuan, Congressman Tony P. Hall, conducted another mission to Rwanda, Burundi
and Geneva during the period February 5-14, 1995. This is part of the CHC's continuing
effort, supported by the Reebok Foundation and several nongovernmental organizations,
to facilitate the unprecedented deployment of United Nations human rights monitors to
Rwanda. CHC staff confinned the following findings and recommendations:

I. The Human Rights Field Office, Rwanda (HRFON.) Becomes Fully Operational

A. Einding
In sharp contrast to their findings in November, 1994, CHC staff on this visit found a
functioning .field office ofHRFOR in Kigali, and an increasingly effective team of
approximately 100 of the totall47 UN human rights monitors approved for deployment in
Rwanda. Monitors at most field sites are performing .all the organic human rights
functions required in Rwanda, ie., monitoring current abuses in both public and private
sectors; Ql:Ulducting genocide investigations; and proyiding teclmical cooperation and
.a-<!ric.e.in admini.>"tration ofjustice. Already HRFORis commencing a vital, perhaps the
most definitive, and certainly the most cost-eJ.fective, impact on recovery and ll.ll1ilm:.
building in Rwanda. Staffing, structure and leadership in the Kigali office have
strengthened remarkably over the past two months. To be sure, European/African regional
tensions have emerged in the Kigali office. Geneva is aware of these tensions and is taking
pains to claritY job descriptions of senior officials to reduce misunderstandings.
]:3. B,~comm~ndatioa
Progress made by the Office Director Bill Clarance needs to be acknowledged and fully
supported by the NGO and governmental communities. Clarance should be provided the
security of a longer-term appointment, at least to the end of the 1995 calendar year. The
Geneva headquarters must underline with Clarance's deputy the agreed division oflabor,
i.e., that tlJ.e deputy will concentrate primarily on ad.mirti~trative, logistics and operational
support matters (while being the alter ego in Clarance's absence)-- thus freeing Clarance
to do 'I'Al.at he does best, i.e., field operations. It is still very early in the operation to be
able to place the HR.FOR completely Oil auto-pilot. In the absence of adequate supporting
am1sory an.d facilitating services from other UN agencies (whose mandate it is to assure
that all the pieces are in place for a successful hUJllJl.Ilitarian operation), the Congressional
Hunger Center will need to continue filling this gap over the next several weeks.
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n. The Human Rights Progra~ in Rwanda Starts to get Respect
A Finding
. ..
..
Human rights field monitors get respect and perfon:nance from local civilian and military
officials to the extent that the monitors establish productive relationships and add value to
the Rwandan nation-building task. The more mature human rights staff are succeeiling in
establishing such relationships and in developing constructive partnerships with the Army,
(RPA), gendarmerie, magistrates and local governro.ent officials. Recognition and respect
from fellow UN agencies is always the hardest for a new "guy on the UN block" to come
by. Yet the negative comments seem to be down sharply from the CHC November visit
and hints of positive UN acceptance in the UN family are appearing in some quarters.
This improved HRFOR professionalism and performance are due in no small measure to
CHC's persistent advocacy and facilitation of 1) Participatory preparedness training;
2)Tougher, more realistic recruiting criteria; 3) Matching people deployments more
closely with the vehicular and logistics deployments essential for mobility in the field; and
4) Suppqrt to an operationally orient.;d office structure for HRFOR, Rwanda. CHC
pressed for, and saw the HCHR achieve, the same standards for selection, training and
deployment of the European Union (EU) monitors as for the monitors from other sources
(the EU monitors are just now in the process of becoming an organic part of the UN
Rwandan operation).
B. Recomxr:mdatiQu
CHC must continue to work to maintain the rigorous standards for personal recruitment,
and to weed out those who prove to be unfit; to improve the standards for the
participatory training workshops (especially, get rid of the dry lectures); to assure full
integration of the EU monitors under Bill Clarance's leadership; to insist on frequent flow
of substantive operational information to interested UN member states (especially to
donor states); and to help facilitate public jnfonnation on this extraordinary example of
impacting people protection and n atjQu-building in a fuiled state.

m. HRFOR Tailors its Operation to Needs on the Ground
A. Finding
In Southeast Rwanda (the Kibungo area where a high Tutsi concentration existed
pre-April 6, 1994) revenge killings, arbitrary arrests and torture by renegade soldiers and
abusive local officials, have driven HRFOR into an intensive surveillance operation. Bill
Clarance invented it and dubbed it "tactical monitoring.'' This creative effort is getting top
. government attention and support in Kigali. It seems to offer the best way to modify
and!or stop the pattern oflocal abuses in perhaps the roost dangerous quarter of Rwanda.
HRFOR is going to the source of the on-going abuses that were first documented in the

/?-.
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Gersony assessment coi.U.Olissioned by the High CollJ.ll1issioner for Refugees (ill-;'HCR) in
late summer 1994.
While HRFOR pe.tfornJS the other functions of its holistic mandate, including
genocide investigation and technical cooperation in the Southeast as well, it is able to
concentrate on these more acceptable sectors (to the Rwandan government) in such
regions as Cyangugu alongside Lake :Kivu in the Soutbw.est. Here local civilian and
military officials, together with the populace, receive human rights education in the
schools; technical advisory services in administration ofjustice (helping on the caseload of
over 20,000 prisoners in deplorable states of detention), and investigation of the horriii.c
acts of genocide that occurred post-April6, in the Cyangugu area. Such welcome and
positive contn'butions make the less palatable pill of ~rrent abJ.!ss;. monitoring easier to
swallow.
The UN human rights team in Cyangugu has had extraordinary success in
cultivating professional and constructive relationships with local civilian and military
officials. The more hopeful climate for hUtnan rights also owes a great deal to the
Cyangugu Prefect; he is a graduate in human rights from the University ofLyon and is a
llll!jor reason for the acceptance and success of the UN's holistic human rights efforts in
that region.

:!LliecommeudatiOA
The creative "tactical monitoring" initiative must be acknowledged (as a Ullljor
innovation by the HRFOR Director Bill Clarance) and supported by both the host
gove:mment and international community. The holistic package ofhurnan rights services,
which can be administered in most of the rest of Rwanda, must be viewed as both organic
and essential to the continued effectiveness of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
This holistic approach must be recognized as a sine qua non for all future human rights
field operations, e.g:, in Burundi. The UN Development Program (UNDP) needs to
support this function as an integral part of the HCHR's mandate and play an active
fundraising role through Round Table donor conferences to enable the HCHR to
discharge this mainstream component ofhis responsibilities.
IV. Human Rights Headquarters in Geneva Must Catch up with its Operational
Culture in the Field
A Finding
There is now a mtntali~, and a developing culture for humap, rights operatioo.5 in
the field. Ir is in Rwanda today; it must be in Burundi tomorrow; and it will be required in
conjunction with all too =Yother current, and future, complex hUJllanitarian
emergencies. But for the Rwanda operation to IIlllintain .momentum and succeed, for a
Bunmdi operation to make an impact, indeed, for the future viability of the very Office of
the High Commissioner itseli; the HCHR must personally devote himself to the rapid
development of both an Qlt~ and capacity within his immediate office in
Geneva. (The immediate office of the new UN High Commissioner for Human rights is
very small, understandably lacks an operational capability at this point, and must rely on.
the larger, legal paperwork-oriented Human Rights Center in Geneva for operational
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backup required for Rwanda. :Mr. Mautner-Markhof of the Center is doing a hercule~job
in providing this support. His considerable skills could b_e leveraged greatly, ho";ever, ifhe
were part of an augmented operational task force orgaru~ to_ the Office of the I?~
Commissioner.) failure or delay in developing this capacity m the Hl...!ili ComnnsSJon~r's
office effectively jeopardizes the Rwanda and Bu,;undi operations. It may also place m.
question the very future ofl!lllintai:ni:ng a Human Rights High Commissioner in the Uruted
Nations.

B.

Recomm~ndation

While High Commissioner Ayala-Lasso indicated in a meeting with CHC
Executive Director Gene Dewey on February 13, that he might need to sweep an
operational capability into his own office for ~-da. he still hoped to be able to mount
future field operations out of the Human Rights Center in Geneva (in part because of turf
concerns within the Center itself). Dewey told hlm, in effect, that there just was not time
for the Center to shift gears from a radically different sectE:tariat role to an operational
~role. US officials in Washington and Geneva must continually reinforce the
imperative for an organic, holistic, human rights QPerational capability in Ayala-Lasso's
immediate office. And the international humanitarian system-- NGOs, l.JN agencies, and
serious UN member states need to a.c~ and sup:p.Q.U the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights as the fuu.a.b. (in addition to l.JNHCR, UNICEF and
WFP), and fhlly. operational agene>: in the UN humanitarian constellation.

V. The Rwandan Government Needs Credit for Ruman Rights Progress, per se, and
to Reinforce 1\-Iore Positive Performance Where its Record is Still Weak
A. Finding
There is commendable discipline and significant human rights progress on the part
of senior Rwandan government officials in Kigali -- especially V1ce President and Defense
Minister Kagame. But Kagame, along with some other senior officials, tends to regard the
current abuse monitoring role ofHRFOR as a vote of no-confidence in the ability of the
government to protect its ov..n citizens. There is insufficient feedback, crediting him v..ith
doing good things, to counteract his negative perception of the UN human rights efforts
RecommendatiQu
Visitors to Kagame, and to other senior Rwandan offi~ials probably need to
overcorrect a bit by acknowledging the RPFs statesmanship in accepting UN human rights
monitors and in taking on the less palatable aspects (i.e. the HRFOR "policing" fimction
with respect to current abuses) along \\lith those the RPF \Velcomes (accountability for
genocide and technical cooperation). CHC staff recommended to HCHR, and he
accepted, the idea of making field visits on his next Rwanda trip (probably around March
10) in the company of Vice President Kagame. They would visit the weak spots in the
Southeast where the vice president and HCHR could see together the problem of abusive
local officials and the need for tactical monitoring. HCHR would be able to commend,
and reinforce, Kagame's action in dealing v..1th these officials (h.e claims to have fired some
of them). In the Southwest (Cyangugu area) they would see together the difference that

1.
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cooperative officials make, and the major contn'butions HRFOR is making, .to confidenc~
and nation-building in Rwanda. Such steps could contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy m
tenns of continued improvements in official Rwandan behavior.

VI. Internal Strengthening of Some lJ'"N Agencies (Especially DHA), and Mu~al
Reinforcement From Others (UNDP) are Essential to Effective UN lluman Rights
Field Operations.

A ;fnternal Strengthening --the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)
1. Findings
DHA's intended function is not to Ulll, or even coordinate, complex hu.man.itarian
operations. UN member states (with strong support in the US Congress from
Representative Tony Hall) created DHA in 1992 to [aQilita~ international humanitarian
operations -- whether emergency relief; or human rights -- and make sure lhey go well.
As such, DHA is the agency accountable -- to the Secretary General, to UN members and
emergency victims-- for how well, and how poorly, an operation goes. Yet, UN member
states have not supported, or insisted sufficiently on the imperative for DHA to organize
and staff itself to assure that such vital field operations as the Rwanda human rights
monitor deployment go well. Largely because of this lack offollow-through by member
states which created DHA, the Congressional Hunger Center faced up to the need to help
fill this gap for the Rwandan human rights operation. Because the office of the HCHR was
so new and inexperienced, "value-added" from outside was needed to help assure
yehjculax: and logistical deployments matched pi:o.ple deployments to Rwanda; HCHR
needed_assistance in quality personnel selection and in ®ality readin!:SS training of.field
monitors; and above all, it needed dedicat!:d fundraising efforts. to sequre adequate
.financial support through the UN's consolidated appeal process. The Congressional
Hunger Center is helping with this stop-gap role, pending development of such a capacity
withln the UN itsel£

2. Recommendation
The Congressional Hunger Center is prepared to continue its operational support
role to UN humanitarian operations, provided sufficient private funding becomes available.
The longer tern~. solution, however, is to flesh out this capacity within the UN Department
of Humanitarian Affairs. Since DHA is already a major agenda item for the summer
session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva, the Rwanda
human rights deployment offers a classic example of the kind of humanitarian operation
DHA was created to facilitate. The US Delegation to ECOSOC should build on this
example, recall the DHA strengthening plan (the Dewey "Get-Well" proposal) the US
Govem:ment pushed in the 1993 ECOSOC session, and develop support in the 1995
ECOSOC meeting to achieve refonns and strengthening which would enable DHA to
perform fully its intended facilitating role in future h = rights deployments (e.g., a
preventive deployment to Burundi) and other major .field operations.
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Technical cooperation for administrative of;usttce ts a central, orgamc feature of
the UNHCHR's holistic human rights operation in Rwanda. The UN Devel~~ment
Program (UNDP), in its responsibilities to oversee the Round Tab.le fun~a.lsmg proc:ss
for Rwanda, has a unique opportunity to reinforce the HCHR's pnmacy m llllplementmg
technical cooperation in human rights for Rwanda. UNDP also needs to lobby for the
HCHR -- both in the Round Table meetings and in the DHA Consolidated Appeals --to
work with key donor states to assure full funding for the modest human rights cost
components in HCHR's Rwanda progrants.

2. Recommendation
The US should develop a conse:u.sus among key UNDP governing council
members to assure full UNDP ;;;uppou, especially financial support, to the UNHCHR in
implementing this core program in Rwanda. Similarly, the US needs to press for support
from both DHA and UNDP for adequate funding for an immediate preventive human
rights monitor.dcployment to Bunmdj
For the High Commissioner's upcoming visit to Rwanda, it is important that he
receive an invitation from the Rwandan govemment, stressing the importance of the
HCHR using the visit to articulate and accelerate his already developed plan of action as
the IJN executivp agent for t~chnical coo.peratjon in tbe administration ofjustice.

V1I. The High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights Need to Share
Information
A Finding
Infortnation on root causes fbr refugees fleeing Rwanda, and. refusing to return to
Rwanda, is vitally important to human rights teams in implementing techo.ical assistance
programs and building confiden.ce inside Rwanda. UNHCR field staff in Zaire have
already contacted UNHCHR staff across Lake Kivu in Cyangugu, suggesting that they
determine root cause through direct interviews in the Zaire (Bukavu) camps. Geneva
hl1.lllall rights headquarters currently holds that its staff can only work in Rwanda,
UNHCR, meanwhile has not received, and/or not responded to any request to share this
"root cause" information obtained by its protection officers in Zaire, Burundi and Tan.zan.ia
camps.

B. Recommendation
CHC staff raised the problem with Mr. Mautner-Madmofat the Human Rights
Center on February 13. Mautner-Markhofagreed to look into the possibilities ofjoint
UNHCRIUNHCHR teams interviewing in the first asylum camps, so as to get around the
problem of operating unilaterally outside Rwanda.
Similarly, a request needs to go to the High Commissioner for Refugees to have
her regional coordinator, Carroll Faubert, share agreed essential elements of information
on a regular, frequeut basis \Vith Bill Clarence in Kigali.
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vm. An Historic Window is Open, Albeit Briefly, for a Preventive Deployment of
Hum11n Rights Monitors in Burundi
A

Fin.dings

Burundi is already far down the slippery slope to a Rwandaclike apocalypse. The
country is an armed camp-- with machetes and Kalashnikofs at the ready (an~ to~ many
of them already in use, even as you read this) at every level ofHutu and Tutst ~oe1ety.
Both the American ambassador and the Secretary General's special representatiVe, have
threats on their lives for trying to get at the truth of atrocities already occurring. Killings
and severe human rights abuses are a daily, and nightly, way oflife. Yet Burundi's
President believes there is still time to help "With history's .first-ever preventive deployment
ofhumru1 rights monitors. The committed, but fragile UN Human Rights Office in
Bujumbura joins the Burundi President in this desperate appeal for monitors to provide a
presence throughout the Burundi countryside. The President's office appealed to CHC's
executive director Dewey on February 11 for help in formulating and implementing such
an unprecedented request. Dewey agreed to help, and suggested that the President's
Special Assistant also insure that the President's speech to the UNHCRIOAU-sponsored
Refugee Conference in Bujumbura on Februa1y 15 include a call for this human. rights
presence. This was done. Dewey further relayed this request and challenge to the Burundi,
and US, permanent representatives to the UN in Geneva, to the UN High Commissioner
for HUilllUl Rights, and to key contacts on the National Security Council staff and the
Human Rights Bureau of the State Department.

B. Recommendations
Again, here is a gap and an apparent need for someone outside the formal UN
structure to perform the DHA-type legwork of making this human rights presence in
Burundi a reality. 'This historic preventive deployment should be facilitated through the
following three-track approach:
·
1. Arrange for the form.al. request to be drafted from the President of Bumndi, to
be relayed through the High. Commissioner for H = Rights (with a copy to the
Secretary-General's Special Representative in Bunm.di) to the UN Secretary-General.
(CHC sta:ffrequested the Human Rights Officer in Bujumbura to work with the assistant
to the president, Kavakourie, who is the former ambassador to Washington, to draft and
dispatch this fotmal request).
2. Press for early introduction and passage in the current session of the UN Huma:n.
Rights Commissioner in Geneva a resolution calling for iromediate funding for, and
deployment o( a preventive human rights monitoring effort throughout the entire country
of Burundi (CHC staff received encouragement for this idea from Political Counsellor
Peter Eichert at the US Mission, Geneva. CHC's executive director requested the Burundi
permanent representative in Geneva to work -..vith Eichert and other .friends of Burundi to
bring this about. Key contacts in Washington were urged to include instructions
supporting this plan to the US Dele9:ation to the current session of the UN Human rililits
~
Commission in Geneva.).
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3. Organize, with State Department's Human Rights Bureau and like-minded
legislators a joint executive/legislative lobbying effort with UN member states of the
Human Rights Commission -- both to pass the preventive deployment resolution, and to
commit funding, on a high priority basis, for early implementation on the ground. Parallel
efforts must be made with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the UN
Peacekeeping Department to factor into the human rights deployment package a workable
security component for the monitors, since threats to such a presence are far greater in
Burundi than in Rwanda. These efforts could well be the most important, and costeffective, investments that the US government, the UN Human Rights Commission, and
indeed the international community as a whole, could make in the next four weeks.

